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Public discourse is ailing. Instead of yielding mutual understanding and 
respect, our debates are often infected with suspicions, accusations, belief 
polarization, and ideological entrenchment. One malady is what Richard 
Lipsky calls the athleticization of politics, “the transposition of sports val-
ues into political discourse” (1979, p. 29). Martha Nussbaum describes the 
phenomenon as follows:
When people think that political debate is something like an athletic 
contest, where the aim is to score points for their own side, they are 
likely to see the ‘other side’ as the enemy and to wish its defeat, or even 
humiliation. It would not occur to them to seek compromise or to find 
common ground . . . with their adversaries. (2010, p. 11)
Unfortunately, the conditions that characterize public discourse often con-
taminate the classroom as well.
As evidence of the effects of athleticization in the classroom, we offer both 
a confession and an observation. The confession is that we are wary of dis-
cussing extremely controversial topics in the classroom. In fact, we are so 
wary that we tend to steer classroom discussion away from such topics and 
sometimes leave certain topics out of a syllabus. So much for the confession. 
The observation is that many of our colleagues have made similar confes-
sions. But perhaps exculpation is not hard to find: After all, such topics are 
avoided precisely because it is believed—not unreasonably—that discussing 
them would produce more heat than light, that discussing abortion, for exam-
ple, is likely to transform a community of learners into a horde of gladiators.
Although such wariness is understandable, it is also tragic. One aim 
of education in a democratic nation is the promotion of healthy civic dis-
course. Another is to prepare students to make valuable contributions to 
the same. In part, the latter aim is accomplished by providing students 
with an environment that fosters the intellectual virtues that characterize 
an examined life. This requires an atmosphere in which the student enjoys 
the freedom to discover and articulate what she believes, to examine how 
well her beliefs hang together, and to probe for underlying assumptions and 
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biases—without the fear that self-disclosure will trigger accusations and 
pigeonholing from fellow students.
We offer no panacea for the disease of classroom athleticization. Nor do 
we have a simple prescription that will ensure productive discussions out-
side the classroom. Nevertheless, we offer some “experimental treatments” 
for promoting the healthy discussion of controversial issues. In the first two 
sections of the chapter, we identify and explain two fallacious patterns of 
thought that often afflict discussions of controversial issues: assailment-by-
entailment (section 1) and the attitude-to-agent fallacy (section 2). In effect, 
these sections diagnose two diseases of discourse. We conclude each section 
with practical suggestions—in the form of thinking routines—for treating 
these disorders. We will argue that part of the cure is to be found in the intel-
lectual virtues. In particular, we will explain how the virtues of intellectual 
carefulness, fairness, charity, and humility can inoculate the mind against 
the fallacies we identify.
1. ASSAILMENT-BY-ENTAILMENT
In this section we draw attention to a mistaken pattern of thinking which is 
common both inside and outside the classroom. It occurs twice in the fol-
lowing dialogue in which two students—Frank and Judith—are discussing 
the moral status of abortion.
FRANK: Hey Judith, what’s your take on abortion? Don’t you agree 
that abortion on demand is morally wrong?
JUDITH: Actually, no. I think that abortion is morally permissible.
FRANK: What!? I couldn’t disagree more. I just can’t believe—like you 
do—that it’s okay to murder an innocent person!
JUDITH: Whoa—who said I believe that? Besides, I just can’t 
believe—like you do—that it’s okay to curtail the rights of 
women!
What’s going on here? The discussion begins with disclosure but ends 
with censure. It begins with Frank and Judith sharing what they believe 
about abortion but ends with each accusing the other of holding a fur-
ther (and repugnant) belief. In their opening statements, Frank and Judith 
discover that they disagree over the moral status of abortion. But notice 
what happens next. In the last two statements, we find belief attributions. 
In each statement, a belief is attributed to the other person. Frank attri-
butes to Judith the belief that it’s permissible to murder an innocent person. 
Judith, in turn, attributes to Frank the belief that it’s permissible to curtail 
the rights of women. Moreover, in each case the attributed belief is a repug-
nant one—that is, a belief that is extremely distasteful or offensive. The 
exchange illustrates a twofold dynamic that often hampers the discussion 
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of controversial topics. The destructive dynamic concerns the belief attribu-
tion, which involves both a fallacious inference and a failure of intellectual 
virtue. We will discuss each of these in turn.
The above belief attributions commit a logical fallacy we call assailment- 
by-entailment. This can be understood as a special type of straw man 
fallacy—a pattern of reasoning that involves characterizing an oppo-
nent’s views so that they appear less plausible than they really are.1 To 
see the problem, notice that Frank and Judith engage in belief attribu-
tion because of their unstated beliefs—specifically beliefs about conditional 
claims. Consider Frank. He doesn’t explicitly say so, but he believes the 
following conditional: If abortion is morally permissible then it is permis-
sible to murder an innocent person. In their exchange, Frank discovers 
that Judith believes the conditional’s if-clause, that abortion is morally 
permissible. He then accuses her of believing something particularly 
repugnant—the conditional’s then-clause, that it is permissible to murder 
an innocent person. This attribution is a mistake on Frank’s part. Although 
he believes the conditional, he has no evidence that Judith does. Thus, 
his belief attribution—his accusation that Judith believes the conditional’s 
then-clause—is unwarranted.
Now consider Judith, who makes the same kind of mistake. Her unstated 
belief is in the following conditional: If abortion is morally wrong then it 
is permissible to curtail the rights of women. She learns that Frank believes 
the conditional’s if-clause. She then accuses him of believing something par-
ticularly repugnant—the conditional’s then-clause, that it is permissible to 
curtail the rights of women. But she has no evidence that Frank believes the 
conditional. So her belief attribution is also unwarranted.
We call this fallacy assailment-by-entailment. The “entailment” is 
expressed by the conditional claim, the claim of the form “P entails Q.” 
The “assailment” consists in one person’s attributing a repugnant belief to 
another person, thus, in effect, censuring them. It will be convenient to have 
generic names for these two people. So—with apologies to namesakes—let’s 
use “Abe” as a name for anyone who commits assailment-by-entailment 
and “Vic” for Abe’s unfortunate victim. Using these names, we can now 
describe the general features of the fallacy. Abe believes P entails Q, where 
Q is an especially repugnant thing to believe. He comes to discover that Vic 
believes P, but Abe lacks sufficient reason to think that Vic believes P entails 
Q. Nevertheless, Abe attributes to Vic the belief that Q.
Let’s now reflect on what is generally wrong with assailment-by- 
entailment. As the example illustrates, Abe attributes an especially repug-
nant belief to Vic. The attribution, however, is unjustified. That is, Abe lacks 
sufficient evidence for thinking that Vic holds the repugnant belief. Notice 
that Vic may, in fact, hold the belief; the problem is that Abe has insufficient 
grounds for thinking that Vic does. In fact, in some cases, Abe has evidence 
that Vic actually rejects the repugnant belief. This evidence might be direct, 
in the form of Vic’s explicit and emphatic rejection of the belief in question; 
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or it might be indirect, consisting in the evidence that Vic is an educated, 
morally upright person, and that most such persons wouldn’t hold such a 
repugnant belief.
Most generally, assailment-by-entailment involves failing to mind one’s 
evidence. In this respect, it is similar to many other fallacies. What makes 
assailment-by-entailment interesting, however, is that it conflates alleged 
or actual logical entailment with belief attribution. In short, Abe conflates 
what he takes Vic’s beliefs to entail with what he takes Vic to believe. To 
unpack this, let us reconstruct Abe’s thinking as proceeding along the fol-
lowing lines:
1. Vic believes P.
2. If P is true then Q is true.
3. So Vic must believe Q.
Suppose Abe is right in accepting (1)—Vic does believe P. And suppose Abe 
is right that P entails Q; that is, (2) is true. Abe nevertheless errs in mov-
ing to the belief attribution represented by (3). That is, Abe errs in moving 
from (1) and (2) to (3). In other words, even if Abe is correct in believing 
(1) and (2), it doesn’t follow that (3) is true, much less that Abe is justified 
in believing (3). (Of course, if Abe is wrong and (2) is false, he commits 
two errors rather than one. He makes a bad inference and employs a false 
premise in doing so. But we’ll leave the second error to the side in order 
to focus on the first.) To further understand Abe’s error, keep in mind that 
there are different doxastic attitudes one can have toward a claim: one can 
believe it (affirm), disbelieve it (deny), or suspend judgment about it (neither 
affirm nor deny). Suspending judgment is the cognitive equivalent of shrug-
ging your shoulders. Now, to see that Abe’s move from (1) and (2) to (3) is 
a mistake, suppose for the sake of argument that Abe is correct in thinking 
that Vic believes P, and moreover, is correct in thinking that P entails Q. 
Suppose, that is, that (1) and (2) are true. Nevertheless, any of the following 
could still be the case:
• Vic believes P but doesn’t have any attitude toward Q; the content of 
Q has never crossed his mind.
• Vic believes P but doesn’t have any attitude about the connection 
between P and Q; although he believes P and has thought about Q, he 
has never thought about whether P entails Q.
• Vic believes P but suspends judgment on Q; he has thought about 
whether Q is true but can’t make up his mind.
• Vic believes P but suspends judgment on whether P entails Q; he can’t 
make up his mind about whether or not the entailment holds.
• Vic believes P but denies Q; he understands Q and thinks that Q is false.
• Vic believes P but denies that P entails Q; he understands both P and 
Q, but denies that the entailment holds.
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In each case, Vic believes P but does not believe P entails Q. Because of this, 
the fact that (1) and (2) are true is consistent with any number of scenarios in 
which (3) is false.2 Thus, Abe errs in moving from (1) and (2)—where the latter 
is a claim about what Abe thinks Vic’s belief entails—to (3), what Abe thinks 
Vic must believe. Put differently, Abe mistakenly draws a conclusion about 
what Vic must believe from what he (Abe) thinks Vic’s belief entails. Abe 
knows that Vic believes P, but because Abe lacks good reasons for thinking 
that Vic also believes that P entails Q, Abe errs in assuming that Vic believes 
Q. Lacking such reasons, Abe’s belief attribution ([3] above) is unjustified.
Notice that Abe’s reasoning to (3) is fallacious even if Abe is correct about 
P’s entailing Q, and even if Vic has good reason to believe that P entails Q. 
In some cases in which Abe performs the assailment-by-entailment inference 
on Vic, Vic may indeed hold incoherent or otherwise irrational beliefs. And 
in some such cases, Abe may be justified in taking (or even declaring that) 
Vic’s set of beliefs to be incoherent or otherwise irrational (perhaps, given 
his other commitments, Vic ought to believe Q). None of that is under dis-
pute here. The present point is about whether Abe is justified in charging Vic 
with the specific crime of believing Q. And for reasons just discussed, Abe’s 
reasoning in that matter is fallacious.
A logical mistake is part of what goes wrong in assailment-by-entailment. 
A helpful way to describe this logical mistake is that it is a failure of careful-
ness. For whatever else intellectual carefulness involves, it surely requires 
attending to one’s evidence. And in committing assailment-by-entailment, 
Abe fails to do this, blurring together alleged logical entailment and belief 
attribution while hastily inferring that Vic believes something awful.
There is more, however. Abe also fails to exhibit the intellectual virtues 
of fairness and charity. More on these virtues in a moment. First, it will help 
to explain in more detail what we mean by intellectual virtues. In general 
terms, intellectual virtues are habits of a well-functioning mind, disposi-
tions that make for cognitive excellence. As understood here, intellectual 
virtues are cognitive character traits that involve a motivation for intel-
lectual goods like true belief, knowledge, and wisdom. As character traits, 
intellectual virtues are typically acquired via training and inculcation—they 
aren’t “hard-wired.”3 Further, as character traits, intellectual virtues differ 
from faculties (e.g., vision) and skills (e.g., mathematical proficiency). These 
latter features help explain why intellectually virtuous agents are admirable. 
They have to work to achieve their virtue (unlike someone born with good 
vision). And their character traits involve their deep and fundamental com-
mitments in a way that mere skills typically do not. In addition to intellec-
tual carefulness, fairness, and charity, such mental habits include humility, 
honesty, firmness, courage, perseverance, and open-mindedness.4 With this 
general understanding of the intellectual virtues in place, let’s consider fair-
ness and charity in particular.
We can begin by comparing these intellectual virtues with their moral 
counterparts. The difference between behaviors characteristic of intellectual 
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fairness and charity is akin to the difference between two familiar moral 
principles:
SILVER RULE: Don’t do to others what you wouldn’t have them do 
to you.
GOLDEN RULE: Do unto others as you would have them do to you.
The Silver Rule, well known across religious and secular moral traditions, 
is a negative imperative (“don’t do X”) that corresponds to our notion of 
moral fairness. The Golden Rule, predominant in the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion, is a positive imperative such that, if we obey it, we both fulfill and go 
beyond the requirements of the Silver Rule. Fulfilling the Golden Rule, it is 
often thought, suffices for the expression of moral charity.
This analogy, though just a start, helps us to see at least this much: In 
moral matters, to be charitable is to go beyond fairness. It is to give to 
another more than he or she deserves, and to do so virtuously. With this point 
in hand, we can unpack the concepts of intellectual fairness and charity— 
as we’ll see, a similar point applies in the intellectual realm.
As a provisional way to put the difference between intellectual fairness 
and charity, we may say that intellectual fairness is a matter of not treating 
the views of others as less plausible than they actually are, while intellec-
tual charity is a matter of treating the views of others as plausible as one 
reasonably can—even if doing so requires improving upon the views others 
actually hold.
It will help to focus on the specific intellectual activity of interpreting oth-
ers’ views.5 In carrying out this activity, we act with intellectual fairness when 
we refrain from interpreting others’ views as less plausible than they really 
are. Being disposed to refrain in this way is central to possessing fairness as 
a character trait—fair agents are disposed to refrain from unfair intellec-
tual acts. They act fairly toward others in the midst of intellectual activities. 
A fair agent does not treat her discussion partners in ways she would not 
wish to be treated (as concerns intellectual endeavors). Further, because she 
exhibits intellectual fairness, the agent with this trait will tend to act fairly 
for the sake of intellectual goods like true belief, knowledge, and wisdom, 
where these goods concern both her interlocutor and the issue under dispute. 
A thinker who is intellectually fair avoids acting unfairly in part as a con-
sequence of a general concern for the truth and related goods. This general 
concern leads to a motivation to hold true beliefs about his interlocutors 
(and so avoid unjustified belief attributions about them) and to seek the truth 
about the disputed issue. With respect to the latter, the intellectually fair 
agent will not (say) dismiss a view because a poorly developed version of it 
is implausible. To dismiss a view for such a reason is to exhibit disregard for 
truth—after all, a more plausible version of the view may lurk nearby.
Whereas intellectual fairness requires that one refrain from rendering 
another person’s views as less attractive than they really are, intellectual 
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charity requires more. In interpreting others’ views, we act with charity 
when we interpret those views so as to make them seem as plausible as we 
reasonably can, even if this requires “massaging” those views in order to 
improve them. We don’t merely avoid attributing to others positions that 
are less plausible than the ones actually held. Rather, we seek the most plau-
sible versions of our interlocutors’ views, where this sometimes requires 
making “friendly amendments” to those views. Further, we do this both for 
the sake of those interlocutors and for the sake of the truth. Such charity is 
intellectually virtuous in part because it ensures that all parties to a dispute 
become familiar with the most plausible available alternatives. It helps to 
ensure informed selection from among competing views and helps us avoid 
rejecting the spirit of a view on the grounds that many renderings of its letter 
are implausible.
An example may further clarify the distinction between fairness and 
charity. Consider a student discussing the moral status of physician-assisted 
suicide. Having cited a number of utilitarian considerations, the student con-
cludes, “So we can see that allowing physician-assisted suicide achieves the 
ideal of Mill’s principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number.” 
The professor sees that this is a patently inaccurate reading of Mill, and so is 
faced with a choice. She can treat the student with mere fairness or she can 
treat the student with charity. As a way of doing the former, she might opt 
for a dead literal interpretation and then criticize the student on the grounds 
that “the greatest happiness for the greatest number” is both an inaccurate 
portrayal of Mill and an inherently problematic phrase. (She might point 
out that the “greatest happiness” part pulls against the “greatest number” 
part—if one distributes scarce goods so as to produce the greatest happiness 
for a given individual, then there’s less to go around for everyone else.) Hav-
ing left the student’s expressed argument in shambles, the professor might 
move on to the next topic for discussion. However, instead of treating the 
student with mere fairness, she could say something like this:
I see what you’re after, though your portrayal of Mill’s principle needs 
a bit of nuance. If we employ Mill’s principle accurately in this context, 
we’ll need to say that an action is right in proportion as it tends to 
promote happiness (or pleasure) and wrong in proportion as it tends 
to promote unhappiness (or pain).6 And you make a good case that the 
policy you recommend appears right, given that principle. Now let’s 
talk a bit more about the details of your argument.
The professor who pursues the latter route is taking occasion to improve 
her student’s view while preserving its spirit. Though she is correcting the 
student, she is doing so by providing an amendment to which the student 
will be amenable. In exercising charity, she’s doing this in part for the stu-
dent’s sake—she’s helping the student avoid an important error and inch 
toward the truth. It is good (epistemically) for the student that she does this. 
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It is also good (epistemically) for the rest of the class and for the professor 
herself. Her charitable interpretation is part of a process that allows all 
involved in the discussion to see the most plausible argument that a utilitar-
ian can put forth on the issue. Thus, her charity is distinctively intellectual 
inasmuch as it aims at epistemic goods.
Let’s return to our discussion of assailment-by-entailment in order to 
see how this fallacy involves failures of intellectual fairness and charity. 
Recall the exchange between Frank and Judith over the morality of abor-
tion. For his part, Frank attributes to Judith the belief that it is permissible 
to murder an innocent person. But surely this attribution is unfair and 
uncharitable. The attributed belief—that it is permissible to murder an 
innocent person—is extremely implausible and morally outrageous. Thus, 
in attributing that belief to Judith, Frank attributes to her a belief that 
is (likely) less plausible than the one she actually holds; further, he fails 
to attribute to her view as much plausibility as he reasonably can. After 
all, several alternative interpretations of Judith’s position are readily avail-
able. Among them: Perhaps she doesn’t believe the conditional claim that 
Frank believes, namely, that if abortion is morally permissible then it is 
permissible to murder an innocent person. Thus, while Judith believes that 
abortion is morally permissible, she doesn’t believe that it is permissible 
to murder an innocent person. To be sure, Frank can still disagree with 
Judith. Indeed, Frank might think that Judith has made a mistake—even 
a terrible one—in failing to believe that abortion entails murder. But inas-
much as intelligent, good-willed people can disagree about that entailment 
relation (i.e., the conditional claim), Frank can attribute intelligence and 
good will to Judith even while thinking that she has made a mistake in not 
seeing things his way. In this case, it’s more charitable for Frank to think 
Judith has made a mistake—even a terrible one—than to attribute to her 
the belief that it is permissible to murder an innocent person. The lat-
ter belief is deeply offensive—especially in Frank’s eyes—and, in any case, 
Judith can reasonably deny that she holds it. In sum, in refraining from 
attributing the repugnant belief to Judith, Frank can act in step with intel-
lectual virtue without acting out of step with his evidence (about Judith or 
the abortion issue).
Of course, for exactly similar reasons, Judith fails to treat Frank with 
intellectual fairness and charity. Judith attributes to him the belief that 
it is permissible to curtail women’s rights. But, again, this attribution is 
unfair and uncharitable. That belief is extremely implausible and morally 
outrageous—especially in Judith’s eyes. Thus, in attributing that belief to 
Frank, Judith fails to think as well of him as she reasonably can—she treats 
his views as less plausible than they really are, a failure of fairness that 
implies a failure of charity. After all, an alternative interpretation of Frank’s 
position is also available: He doesn’t believe the conditional that Judith 
believes, that if abortion is morally wrong then it is permissible to curtail the 
rights of women. Thus, while Frank believes that abortion is morally wrong, 
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he doesn’t believe that it is permissible to curtail women’s rights. And so on. 
For Judith, acting in step with intellectual virtue would involve refraining 
from the belief attribution; moreover, she can do so without acting out of 
step with her evidence.
As already suggested, thinkers who possess the intellectual virtues of care-
fulness, fairness, and charity will characteristically avoid committing the 
assailment-by-entailment fallacy. Intellectually careful agents are disposed 
to consider whether their evidence supports the claim that their dissenters 
hold repugnant beliefs. And intellectually fair and charitable agents are dis-
posed to avoid attributing repugnant beliefs to others—at least when more 
friendly attributions are reasonable. When such agents exercise good cog-
nitive character, they will avoid committing the assailment-by-entailment 
fallacy.
Of course, it’s one thing to understand how virtuous thinkers act, and 
quite another to be disposed to act in those ways. For example, when stu-
dents lack the intellectual virtues, their character won’t help to save them 
from vicious thinking. So, it’s important to say something about how the 
virtues may be acquired, or at any rate, about how students can more often 
behave in ways virtuous thinkers would behave, even before these students 
actually acquire the virtues.
Recent work on thinking routines is helpful to this end. In his book Intel-
lectual Character (2002), Ron Ritchhart notes several features of so-called 
“thinking routines.” These are routines involving thinking that: (i) consist 
of a few steps; (ii) are easy to teach and learn; (iii) are easily supported; 
(iv) can be used repeatedly in a number of different contexts; and (v) are 
explicitly geared toward helping those who practice them become better 
thinkers. One such routine is “Claim-Support-Question” (or CSQ). When 
students apply this routine, they isolate the claim under consideration; they 
then examine the support that has been provided for the claim; finally, they 
ask questions (e.g., they ask to what extent the support for the claim is 
adequate).
The link between thinking routines and intellectual virtues is simple: By 
using thinking routines, students engage in cognitive behavior that approxi-
mates that of excellent (virtuous) thinkers. As author and educator Philip 
Dow explains, “Thinking routines serve as an important bridge connecting 
our everyday thinking with intellectually virtuous aims.”7 Thinking rou-
tines, in other words, can help foster students’ acquisition of intellectual vir-
tues by enabling students to practice the thinking patterns of intellectually 
virtuous thinkers. And even in cases where students don’t finally acquire the 
virtues, thinking routines can help students more often think in characteris-
tically virtuous ways.
With this in mind, we suggest two thinking routines that are especially 
relevant to avoiding the assailment-by-entailment fallacy. Because both rou-
tines ask students to consider the logical link between claims and supporting 
evidence, they can be regarded as sitting on the “scaffolding” of the CSQ 
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routine. Indeed, the first suggested routine is a strategic application of CSQ. 
In the context of controversial discussions, these routines should foster cog-
nitive behaviors characteristic of a careful, fair, charitable thinker.
• Attitude or Entailment? When they are tempted to attribute a repug-
nant belief to a classmate (or when they have already done this), stu-
dents should be asked to consider the attitudes they are attributing 
to others, along with the grounds for those attributions. They should 
isolate a claim (e.g., so-and-so believes murder is permissible), and 
question the support for that claim (e.g., that so-and-so is pro-choice, 
a position which a pro-life student may take to have a repugnant 
entailment). For instance, the students may be invited to ask a ques-
tion of the form: How might someone accept the antecedent of a 
conditional but not its consequent (and so not the conditional itself)? 
The distinction between belief attribution and logical entailment 
provides further help here, and instructors can introduce that dis-
tinction. Perhaps students merely have grounds for thinking that a 
dissenter’s belief entails the repugnant claim. Once students see this, 
the debate becomes less personal. It becomes more about testing for 
logical entailments and less about pinning problematic beliefs to one’s 
classmates.
Attitude or Entailment can be combined with a second routine—one 
that is especially appropriate once logical entailments become the focus of 
discussion:
• Real or Apparent Entailment? If a student thinks that his dissenter’s 
belief entails something repugnant, instructors may ask the student 
to consider inviting his dissenter to discuss whether or not the entail-
ment holds. For example, Frank and Judith might be invited to discuss 
the following questions: Does the pro-life view really entail that it is 
permissible to curtail women’s rights? And, does the pro-choice view 
really entail that it is permissible to murder innocent people? Perhaps 
the relevant beliefs only appear to have the repugnant entailments. 
For students to act in ways characteristic of carefulness, fairness, and 
charity, they should at least consider these possibilities, and this may 
advance their discussion.
Of course, there are many additional ways of helping students avoid the 
assailment-by-entailment fallacy, just as there are many more ways of fos-
tering intellectual virtues. The routines just described are simply two clear, 
concrete ways of helping students move toward intellectual virtue and away 
from a fallacy that plagues many classroom discussions. We’ll return to the 
idea of thinking routines below. But first, we want to name and shame a 
second fallacy that often arises in debates over controversial issues.
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2. THE ATTITUDE-TO-AGENT FALLACY
Having committed the error of assailment-by-entailment, we can make our-
selves vulnerable to further bad inferences. More specifically, we can dispose 
ourselves to make unwarranted inferences from a person’s attitude toward 
a claim (belief, disbelief, suspension of judgment) to a conclusion about the 
agent herself. In what remains, such inferences will be dubbed attitude-to-
agent inferences.
Let’s return to the abortion example to illustrate such an inference. After 
learning that Judith is pro-choice, Frank accuses her of believing that murder 
is permissible. And Judith, after learning that Frank is pro-life, accuses him 
of believing that it’s permissible to curtail women’s rights. As we saw, both of 
these moves involve the assailment-by-entailment fallacy. But one can imagine 
their conversation continuing (and ending!) with the following disparagements:
FRANK: You’re a moral monster!
JUDITH: You’re a misogynistic pig!
These accusations stem from belief attributions: Frank moves from Judith 
believes that it’s permissible to murder innocent people to Judith is a moral 
monster, whereas Judith moves from Frank believes that it’s permissible to 
curtail women’s rights to Frank is a misogynist. Each is a clear attitude-to-
agent inference. Moreover, each inference is unjustified. Generally speak-
ing, there is a logical gap between she believes such-and-such and she is a 
so-and-so. That is, an isolated claim about a person’s propositional attitude 
does not justify a negative evaluation of the person herself.8 Below, we will 
say more about the nature and folly of this kind of mistake. And we’ll draw 
upon recent research in social psychology to show that the attitude-to-agent 
fallacy is dangerous for an additional reason: We’re easily tempted toward 
it. But first, let’s consider another example.
Comedians Kate Smurthwaite and Steve Harvey recently made head-
lines for their controversial remarks about people who hold religious views 
opposed to their own. In a heated discussion on the British TV debate 
show The Big Questions, Smurthwaite (an atheist) quipped, “Faith by defi-
nition is believing in things without evidence. And, personally, I don’t do 
that because I’m not an idiot.”9 Lest you think only atheists are capable of 
such bluster, consider an exchange between Harvey and Joy Behar on Larry 
King Live. Harvey, a Christian, was unsure how to define the term “athe-
ist.” So he asked Behar for a definition. She replied, “An atheist is someone 
who doesn’t quite believe that . . . there is some god out there.” Harvey 
responded, “Well then, to me, you are an idiot. . . . If you believe that, then 
I don’t like talking to you.” In each of these cases, the comedian moves 
immediately from a claim about their dissenter’s attitude (belief or disbelief 
in God) to a claim about the dissenter. In Smurthwaite’s case it’s having faith 
that suffices to make one an idiot; in Harvey’s, it’s the lack of it.
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What’s wrong with these attitude-to-agent inferences? Most generally, 
they’re faulty because their premises (claims about an agent’s attitude toward 
some proposition) are poor evidence for their conclusions (claims about the 
agent herself). And no inference is good if its premises fail to provide good 
evidence for its conclusion. There is, in short, a large logical chasm between 
a single belief attribution (e.g., she’s against affirmative action) and a nega-
tive evaluation of an agent (e.g., she’s a racist). Having been warned about 
this gap—it is to be hoped—we’ll be less prone to fall into it.
The above attitude-to-agent inferences are fallacies of insufficient evi-
dence. But many fallacious inference patterns share this fault. So, it will be 
helpful to diagnose attitude-to-agent fallacies in more detail. This diagnosis 
draws attention to certain features of the fallacies that, once recognized, can 
help inoculate us against them.
The first feature we’ll highlight concerns the way attitude-to-agent infer-
ences often fail to exclude alternative explanations of a dissenter’s belief. 
Consider Harvey’s inference:
PREMISE: Kate is an atheist (she believes there’s no God).
CONCLUSION: Kate is an idiot.
Harvey doesn’t define what he means by “idiot”—definitions aren’t his 
strong suit. But he seems to take the term not to convey some sort of gen-
eral disdain (as would, say, “jackass”), but rather to connote some sort of 
cognitive defect (perhaps ignorance or close-mindedness or dogmatism). But 
taken this way, the premise of Harvey’s argument not only fails to force us 
to the conclusion, by itself, it doesn’t even point us in that direction. There 
are many alternative conclusions that are consistent with the premise of this 
argument. Consider just three of them:
• Kate thought carefully about God’s existence and formed her belief on 
the basis of the best evidence she could muster.
• Kate formed her atheistic belief after moderately careful reflection on 
the basis of moderately good evidence.
• Kate formed her atheistic belief hastily, on the basis of poor evidence, 
but this is uncharacteristic of her—she’s usually quite careful.
All of these conclusions—and more besides—are consistent with the premise 
that Kate is an atheist. And given just this premise, all of these conclusions 
are hypotheses that explain Kate’s atheism at least as well as the explana-
tion that Kate is an idiot. The atheist-to-idiot inference fails to rule out these 
alternative hypotheses. Without further evidence, one has no more reason 
to accept the idiot conclusion than any of its alternatives. Given these “live” 
alternatives, one is likely to believe falsely if one infers that Kate is an idiot. 
One should not draw this inference—at least not without further evidence. 
(Parallel remarks apply to Smurthwaite’s theist-to-idiot inference.)
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It is worth pausing to unpack this point. In general, if we disagree with 
someone, we can stick to our guns without attributing anything negative to 
the other person’s character. This is true even when we know that the other 
person has all the same relevant evidence that we ourselves have. Suppose, 
to return to our example, that Steve is a theist who has all the same evidence 
relevant to God’s existence as Kate has. Steve then meets Kate and discovers 
that she’s an atheist. He then learns that Kate has all of the same evidence 
that he (Steve) has. In these circumstances, Steve need not infer that Kate 
is an idiot. Indeed, he shouldn’t infer this. But what can he sensibly think 
about her instead? One straightforward and charitable thing for Steve to 
think is that Kate has simply made a mistake in evaluating the evidence. 
Somehow, she doesn’t see what Steve is able to see—perhaps because of 
some subtle blind spot or uncharacteristic error in reasoning.10 Consistent 
with this, Steve might nevertheless admire Kate’s intellect on the whole and 
assume that she is sincerely seeking the sober truth.
Crucially, this line of thought is right even if Steve knows he and Kate 
have all the same evidence. But why think he’s in position to know this? And 
why think that we will often be in a good position to think that we and our 
dissenters share the same evidence? To put it tersely, it can be difficult even 
to grasp the contents and workings of our own minds. It is very often more 
difficult to grasp the contents and workings of someone else’s.11 This coun-
sels even further caution about making the inference from what someone 
believes to a general and negative assessment of her intellectual character. 
For if we aren’t sure what evidence our dissenter has, we’re very poorly 
placed to make a judgment about whether her belief is rational given that 
evidence—let alone to make a judgment to the effect that she’s an irrational 
or intellectually vicious person. One mistake does not an idiot make.
Two analogies may help amplify this point. Suppose we’re watching a 
baseball game and watch just one performance of a particular batter. Sup-
pose that, on this occasion, the batter strikes out. We shouldn’t infer from 
this that he’s a lousy hitter. Having viewed just one performance, we’re in 
no position to draw an overarching claim about the player’s hitting com-
petence. And if this is right, then the parallel point applies to what Steve 
should think about Kate. This point is especially apt when it comes to cer-
tain controversial topics. Here, such inferences are more like thinking some-
one is clumsy because he fails a difficult parkour flip. Just as such acrobatics 
place humans at the edge of their physical abilities, discussion of contro-
versial issues in religion, ethics, and politics places us at the edge of our 
cognitive limits—which is all the more reason to insist on fairness and char-
ity in these contexts. Here is the take-home point: At least without further 
evidence, we’re unjustified in making inferences from another agent’s dox-
astic attitudes (she believes P) to negative attributions regarding the agent 
herself—that she’s dumb or wicked or treacherous.
It’s worth noting that the attitude-to-agent inference is something like the 
reverse of an ad hominem argument. In a typical ad hominem, one moves 
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from a negative assessment of a dissenter—“she’s biased or uninformed or 
stupid” to a claim that the dissenter’s belief is false—“she’s wrong about 
X.” In an attitude-to-agent inference, one moves from what one takes to 
be an erroneous belief to a negative assessment of another’s character. It is 
uncontroversial that the first maneuver is a logical mistake—there’s a large 
logical gap between premise and conclusion. But as should be clear, the 
second sort of inference is also fallacious. It is not as though the logical gap 
shrinks when one tries to jump from the other direction.12
What makes an attitude-to-agent inference dangerous isn’t merely the 
fact that it’s careless and unwarranted—though that would be bad enough. 
It’s also unfair and uncharitable. In the context of assessing another person’s 
intellectual character, fairness requires that one refrain from attributing to 
another a character that is worse than it reasonably seems, given one’s evi-
dence. Charity requires that one actively seek to attribute to another the 
best cognitive character one reasonably can, given one’s evidence. But then, 
clearly, moving straight from she and I disagree to she’s an idiot is neither 
fair nor charitable. Inferring the latter claim from the former should be our 
last resort. It is a move to be made only after we have explored and elimi-
nated alternative attributions that are consistent with the fact that our dis-
cussion partner holds a contrary view. To sum up intellectual fairness in this 
context: We wouldn’t want others to perform a negative attitude-to-agent 
inference on us, so we shouldn’t perform this inference on them. To sum up 
intellectual charity in this context: We would want others to perform the 
most winsome assessments of our intellectual character that they reasonably 
can, so we should perform this assessment on them.
As we’ve seen, the attitude-to-agent fallacy should be avoided for several 
reasons. It leads us into false and unwarranted beliefs. Worse still, it leads 
us into false and unwarranted beliefs that are harmful to others. In virtue 
of this, it breeds dissension and soils discourse. These features alone should 
prompt us toward vigilance against the fallacy. But there’s another reason 
we should redouble our efforts to avoid it: Research in social psychology 
suggests that humans are disposed to commit the fallacy.
As psychologist Robert Abelson insightfully observes, we treat our beliefs 
like possessions. Consider how we speak of our beliefs. We acquire them, 
we obtain them, we buy into them, we maintain them, we abandon them, 
we discard them—just as we do our cars and computers. As a result, when 
our beliefs are under attack, we protect them just as we protect our physical 
possessions.13 And clearly, when we find ourselves party to disagreement 
over our cherished beliefs, those beliefs are under attack. In such circum-
stances, we may be especially vulnerable to questionable inferences. And 
while this vulnerability may make such inferences understandable, it does 
not make them epistemically justifiable.
One well-known mechanism that can lead to poor inferences is cognitive 
dissonance. Carol Tavris and Elliot Aronson describe it like this: “Cogni-
tive dissonance is a state of tension that occurs whenever one holds two 
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cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, opinions) that are psychologically 
inconsistent.”14 Such dissonance, they explain, produces mental discomfort 
that prompts us to resolve the tension between competing cognitions.
Suppose, for example, that Bud drinks a lot of beer and, because he’s not 
drunk all the time, he knows that he drinks a case of beer every day. If he 
also comes to believe that drinking large amounts of alcohol is bad for his 
health, he will experience cognitive dissonance. He’ll then be prompted to 
remove this dissonance. Bud might tell himself, “Perhaps there’s a flaw in 
the studies thought to expose the dangers of alcohol.” Or Bud might resolve 
the dissonance by giving up the habit, or by telling himself that he’ll quit 
very soon.
It’s easy to see how cognitive dissonance might make a person vulnerable 
to the attitude-to-agent fallacy. Notice that the phenomenon of disagreement 
is a common source of dissonance. For when we’re made aware of intelli-
gent, sincere people who disagree with us, we thereby receive at least some 
evidence that our beliefs are mistaken or unwarranted15—and this can intro-
duce dissonance. To make this concrete, suppose Peggy believes that God 
exists and comes to believe that Sue, an intelligent and good-willed person, 
disagrees with her. Dissonance theory says that under such circumstances, 
Peggy will attempt to reduce the dissonance between these two beliefs. And 
if she’s prone to protect her most cherished beliefs, Peggy will do this by try-
ing to salvage her belief about God. She may be tempted to do this by aban-
doning her belief that Sue really is intelligent and sincere, and by adopting 
some other (less flattering) belief about Sue. In other words, the cognitive 
dissonance may well tempt Peggy toward the attitude-to-agent fallacy. Of 
course, things don’t have to go this way. The disagreement may lead Peggy 
to revise her belief about God, or to make a more virtuous inference about 
Sue (e.g., that Sue has simply made a mistake). But given her awareness of 
the stakes and the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance (psychologists liken 
our tendency to reduce it as akin to the tendencies to reduce hunger and 
thirst), the circumstances should clearly raise Peggy’s guard. Under the cir-
cumstances described, she’s clearly more prone to making attitude-to-agent 
inferences than she would otherwise be.
An additional reason for caution is the human tendency toward what 
psychologists call fundamental attribution error.16 This error—called “fun-
damental” because it’s so pervasive in human cognition—concerns our ten-
dency to overestimate the influence of stable character on the actions of 
others and to underestimate the influence of others’ situations in explaining 
their behavior. For example, if we see another bump into a table, we’re apt 
to characterize him as clumsy. If we ourselves bump the table, well, it was 
poorly placed and the room was too small. Likewise, if we notice that some-
one is nervous before singing in public, we’re prone to characterize her as a 
nervous person. If we ourselves are nervous prior to a performance, it’s just 
because we’re in a stressful situation—it’s not because we’re characteristi-
cally nervous. If we see a father bawling out his kids, we think he’s a mean 
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dad, but if we yell at our kids, it’s because we’re especially stressed and 
they’re being especially obnoxious.
The research on fundamental attribution error is ongoing. At this stage, 
there is no consensus about the exact frequency with which human subjects 
fall prey to this sort of reasoning. However, many psychologists think we 
are highly susceptible to this mistake. This is relevant to our discussion of 
the attitude-to-agent fallacy. For the two inference patterns are strikingly 
similar. In a simple case, when committing the fundamental attribution 
error, one moves from a single performance (he yelled at his kids) to a char-
acter attribution (he’s a mean person). In committing the attitude-to-agent 
fallacy, one moves from a single belief of another person (she’s an athe-
ist) to a broader negative evaluation of the person herself (she’s an idiot). 
Further, suppose we think of beliefs as cognitive performances. Given that 
thought, whenever someone commits the attitude-to-agent fallacy and con-
cludes that her dissenter has bad character, she thereby commits the funda-
mental attribution error. So some cases of the attitude-to-agent fallacy are 
themselves instances of the fundamental attribution error. In light of the 
similarity between the two inference patterns, the research on fundamental 
attribution error should set us on guard against the attitude-to-agent fal-
lacy. If we’re prone to commit the one, there’s reason to think we’re prone 
to commit the other.17
We’ll close this essay by showing briefly how the intellectual virtues of 
carefulness, fairness, charity, and humility can help avert the attitude-to-
agent fallacy, and by suggesting some thinking routines that may help stu-
dents engage in more intellectually virtuous ways.
First, the above attitude-to-agent inferences suggest a lack of mindful-
ness about the link between a claim (she is a so-and-so) and the evidence 
invoked to support it (she believes such-and such). Normally, characteristi-
cally careful agents will not commit errors of this sort. Likewise, when the 
cause of a disagreement can be explained without attributing bad character 
(for example, when it can be explained by a dissenter’s error in evaluating 
evidence), a fair thinker will refrain from attributing bad character to her 
dissenter. And a charitable thinker will actively seek to cast her opponent’s 
intellectual character in the best reasonable light.
When it comes to the attitude-to-agent inference, it almost goes without 
saying that exercising fairness and charity curbs the fallacy and leads to 
better discussions. After all, fair, charitable people tend not to call an inter-
locutor idiotic or dangerous simply because they espouse a different view. 
And it’s not as though it would take much to improve discussions in which 
people do engage in such name-calling. A dab of fairness and a dash of 
charity can improve the quality of such discussions significantly. Moreover, 
the exercise of these virtues will invite consideration of why one’s dissenter 
believes as she does. To put it in a personal way: If I refrain from think-
ing that my dissenter is an idiot, I’m thereby open to consider alternative 
explanations of her belief. Perhaps she has not assessed her evidence well; or 
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perhaps her evidence is misleading. Or perhaps I’m the one who has made 
a mistake or whose evidence is misleading. Intellectual humility would seem 
to require that I at least consider these possibilities—especially once I come 
to see that the “she’s an idiot” explanation is both unfair and unjustified. 
And if I cease to see my dissenter as an idiot, I may come to see her as some-
one from whom I can learn. If I come reasonably to see her as intelligent 
and well meaning, I may even consider the possibility that I am mistaken.
But again: Learning that the virtues benefit those who possess them is 
of little help to those who don’t yet have them. Those in that group need 
help—help in eventually acquiring the intellectual virtues and in more often 
thinking like virtuous thinkers in the meantime. The following applications 
of the CSQ thinking routine are among the resources that may help:
• Attitude or Agent? Students who are tempted to attribute to a dis-
senter (agent) a vicious character trait should consider whether they 
have good grounds for this. In particular, they should question whether 
their only support for this attribution claim is their dissenter’s attitude 
toward the proposition under dispute. If it is, then the corresponding 
inference is unjustified.
• Alternative Explanations: As a supplement to Attitude or Agent, stu-
dents should consider alternative (non-character-based) explanations 
for their dissenter’s belief. For example, perhaps the dissenter simply 
made an error on this occasion, or perhaps she’s perfectly rational, after 
all—perhaps the student making the attribution has made the mistake.
• Argue the Opposite: Students who hold a position on an issue can 
be assigned to argue in favor of the opposite of their position. So, for 
instance, if a student supports a pro-choice position on abortion, he 
or she may be required to argue for the pro-life view (and vice versa). 
This sort of assignment—doubtless in use by many professors—allows 
students to enter sympathetically into their dissenters’ views. It thereby 
fosters intellectual fairness and charity.
Regular practice with these routines can dispose students to stop and evalu-
ate the support for claims that their dissenters are idiots, moral monsters, 
and the like. The routines thereby foster intellectual carefulness and do so in 
a way that leads students to consider the possibility that those with whom 
they disagree are worth taking seriously. In other words, the routines foster 
carefulness in a way that also fosters fairness, charity, and humility.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The athleticization of the classroom makes it difficult for educators to pro-
vide an atmosphere in which students can engage in mutually beneficial 
and constructive dialogue. We have identified two patterns of thought that 
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frequently contribute to this difficulty—the assailment-by-entailment and 
attitude-to-agent fallacies—and have shown how damaging these fallacies 
can be, both to public discourse and to classroom discussions. These fallacies 
eat away at the quality of our discussions like a cancer; thus, they demand a 
cure. We have suggested that the intellectual virtues of carefulness, charity, 
fairness, and humility are part of this cure. Those who possess these virtues 
are largely inoculated from the fallacies, and even those who are still vulner-
able to the fallacies can lessen their effects by seeking to inculcate the vir-
tues. We have suggested several thinking routines that can be employed to 
this end, including Attitude or Entailment?, Real or Apparent Entailment?, 
Attitude or Agent?, and Alternative Explanations. It is our hope that the use 
of such routines, together with an increased mindfulness of the above falla-
cies, might help to foster genuine self-understanding, mutual understanding, 
and healthy civic discourse.18
NOTES
 1 Not all instances of the straw man fallacy are instances of assailment-by-
entailment. In general, one commits a straw man when one characterizes the 
position of one’s dissenter so as to make it seem less reasonable or attractive 
than it really is. That is, one attributes to the dissenter a less reasonable or less 
attractive view than she really holds and does so for the sake of discrediting 
that position. However, in the case of assailment-by-entailment, one does this 
in a very subtle and specific way: Namely, one starts with a belief a dissenter 
actually holds. One then adds a claim about what that belief entails, where this 
claim may or may not be true, and may or not be believed by one’s dissenter, 
and where the consequence of the conditional is something repugnant. One 
then attributes the corresponding repugnant belief to one’s dissenter. As the 
examples of assailment-by-entailment in section 1 make clear, to reason in this 
way is to commit a kind of straw man fallacy—for it is a way of making an 
opponent’s beliefs seem less reasonable than they really are. Thanks to Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong for helpful discussion here.
 2 Even in the case where Vic believes P and Vic believes that P entails Q, it still 
doesn’t follow that Vic believes Q. Belief is not closed under logical entailment.
 3 Some epistemologists—“virtue reliabilists”—understand intellectual virtues as 
reliable (truth-conducive) innate cognitive faculties, such as good vision and 
good reasoning. We have no objection to this terminology, nor to the idea that 
“faculty virtues” play a key role in a complete virtue epistemology. We view our 
project, which focuses on so-called “character virtues,” as complementary to 
the work of virtue reliabilists. For prominent expressions of virtue reliabilism, 
see Sosa (2007) and (2009), and Greco (2010). For discussion of the relation-
ship between faculty virtues and character virtues, see Baehr (2011, ch. 4).
 4 For further discussion, see especially Roberts and Wood (2007).
 5 The discussion of intellectual charity in this section benefits from that of Rob-
erts and Wood (2007, pp. 73–78).
 6 Mill (2001, p. 7).
 7 Dow (2013, p. 132).
 8 Of course, if one has information about a person in addition to knowing that 
he believes the isolated claim, then one may be justified in moving from a 
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claim about what someone believes to a negative assessment of his character. If 
I know that you’re a well-educated, modern adult who has thought long and 
hard about the issue, and then learn that you believe sex slavery is permissible, 
I have reason to think that your character is morally suspect. But in a way, 
such a case illustrates the point to be made in this section: For in the case just 
described, I don’t move from an isolated claim about your belief to a negative 
assessment of your character. The additional information about your education 
and social setting are doing crucial evidential “work” in the inference. But in 
that case, the inference isn’t an attitude-to-agent inference of the sort under 
discussion.
 9 It is possible to see something like assailment-by-entailment in Smurthwaite’s 
comments. For present purposes, we leave this to the side.
10 For a detailed development of this line of thought, see Thomas Kelly (2005). 
Though Kelly’s work addresses the issue of what one should think of one’s dis-
senters, its primary focus is a related question: Should disagreement lead one 
to abandon one’s own beliefs about the disputed topic itself? This question has 
spawned a large literature in epistemology. See, in addition to Kelly’s paper, Feld-
man (2006) and Christensen (2009). See also the essays in Feldman and Warfield 
(2010), Machuca (2013), and Christensen and Lackey (2013). For a book-length 
introduction to the epistemology of disagreement, see Frances (2014).
11 For more on this point, see King (2012).
12 Thanks to Keith Wyma for helpful discussion here.
13 See the discussion of Abelson’s work in Thomas Gilovich (1991, pp. 85–87).
14 Aronson and Tavris (2007, p. 13). Festinger (1957) is the seminal work on dis-
sonance theory.
15 On this, see Christensen (2009).
16 See Ross and Nisbett (1991).
17 As we suggest, it would be premature to claim that the research demonstrates 
conclusively that we’re vulnerable to the fundamental attribution error, much 
less the attitude-to-agent fallacy (see Sabini, Siepmann, and Stein, 2001). Nev-
ertheless, even if the evidence doesn’t justify full belief that we’re prone to the 
attitude-to-agent fallacy, it seems to justify caution whenever we find ourselves 
embroiled in disagreement. Unless and until we get strong evidence that we 
have no fallacious tendency, it’s best to stand watch against it.
18 The authors contributed equally to this essay. The authors wish to thank Jason 
Baehr for the opportunity to extend and further develop their previous efforts 
on these topics, which appeared in Garcia and King (2013). Some of the para-
graphs here are borrowed and adapted from that work. For helpful comments 
and discussion, we would like to thank Mike Austin, Nathan Ballantyne, 
Tomás Bogardus, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Amy Garcia, Gary Varner, Kristie King, 
Tim Pawl, Dan Speak, Shari Tishman, Peter Wicks, Keith Wyma, and Dan Yim. 
We thank Jason Baehr and an anonymous reviewer for providing extensive and 
helpful comments.
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